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Phenomenology, Empiricism, and Constructivism 
in Paolo Parrini’s Positive Philosophy 
 
Introduction 
Paolo Parrini has developed a philosophical view that is based on the compari-
son between different schools of thought and on their integration into an original 
synthesis. Parrini follows his master Giulio Preti in bringing into dialogue, espe-
cially, Kantian philosophy, logical empiricism and Husserlian phenomenology. In 
this work, I shall highlight the role of phenomenology in some central aspects of 
Parrini’s philosophy, arguing that Parrini’s reading of phenomenology leads to a 
phenomenological form of empirical realism. In the first section, I shall highlight 
the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-
foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, 
I shall stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in 
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investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the rela-
tionship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I shall concen-
trate on some lines of development of the phenomenological empirical realism 
that is revealed by Parrini’s reflection, through a comparison of Husserl’s genetic 
phenomenology, Mary Hesse’s network model and the tradition of neutral mon-
ism. 
 
 
1. Positive Philosophy 
The expression “positive philosophy” refers to the philosophical view that is 
developed by Parrini in Knowledge and Reality (Parrini 1998), Sapere ed 
interpretare (Knowing and Interpreting, Parrini 2002), Il valore della verità (The 
Value of Truth, Parrini 2011) and in various other essays. Parrini distinguishes be-
tween the terms “positivistic” and “positive”. The latter refers to a philosophical 
attitude that remains valid notwithstanding the crisis of the positivistic philoso-
phies of the past and that consists in problematizing every alleged absolute 
knowledge. 
Positive philosophy is developed as an alternative to two opposite philosophi-
cal views that can be found in the history of philosophy and in recent epistemolog-
ical debates: radical relativism and metaphysical realism. 
Within contemporary epistemology, radical relativism is the consequence of 
some views that are especially developed within the “new philosophy of science” 
and that take to the extreme the thesis of the “theory-ladenness of observation”. 
These views claim that changes in the theories through which we aim at reaching 
objective knowledge of reality, lead to a change of reality itself. Therefore, radical 
relativism is the thesis that there are as many truths and realities as there are theo-
ries and conceptual frameworks through which we refer to reality and that these 
truths and realities are reciprocally “incommensurable”. 
Parrini acknowledges some virtues of these non-absolutistic conceptions of 
knowledge. At the same time, he argues that if radical relativism is the claim that 
truth is relative, it is self-contradictory. On the other hand, if radical relativism is 
just the statement of a personal conviction that lays no claims of intersubjective 
validity, it is philosophically irrelevant. For this reason, we must set a limit on the 
extent of relativism, by distinguishing between relativity of truth (aletic relativ-
ism) and relativity of the attributions of truth (epistemic relativism). Parrini thus 
denies the relativity of truth, arguing for a form of epistemic relativism that con-
ceives of truth as a regulative ideal that guides our epistemic efforts (see Parrini 
2015: 45). 
At the same time, Parrini’s positive philosophy is developed in contrast to the 
opposite of radical relativism, i.e. metaphysical realism. This is the view in con-
temporary epistemology that seeks to overcome the critiques of metaphysics de-
veloped by Kant and by the logical empiricists. This trend in contemporary phi-
losophy is fueled by Willard Van Orman Quine’s critique of the two dogmas of 
3 
empiricism, which were at the basis of the reductionist version of the principle of 
verification. The crisis of logical empiricism has given up its place to a reprisal of 
metaphysics. Various forms of the renaissance of metaphysics in contemporary 
philosophy share the commitment to a view of knowledge as aimed at establishing 
a correspondence between ordo idearum and ordo rerum and therefore as aimed at 
“mirroring” an absolute reality “in itself”. However, Parrini argues that these 
foundationalist and absolutist conceptions of knowledge risk legitimising their op-
posite, i.e. scepticism. This is because metaphysical realism defines the concept of 
reality as absolutely transcendent with respect to the act of knowing. In this way, it 
struggles with the difficulty of pointing at criteria that allow us to verify the corre-
spondence between our knowledge claims and a reality that is absolutely trans-
cendent with respect to them. On this point, Parrini draws on Preti’s idea, that 
stressed the essential connection between radical scepticism and metaphysical re-
alism: 
 
“Until we remain stuck in an approach to the problem of knowledge that is 
conditioned by the “dogmatical” acceptance of a knowing subject that is opposed 
to the ‘existence of a real world that is independent from the act of knowing’, we 
cannot overcome the sceptical standpoint. It is this ontologically doomed approach 
that legitimates the sceptical standpoint […]. This is especially clear when we 
consider the scholastic formula veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus as the 
criterion of truth: our thinking does not contain any criterion for establishing the 
adaequatio because the criterion is outside, in the res. We must ‘catch’ and 
‘grasp’ reality but we cannot ever know if ‘we caught a real thing or a shadow’. 
For this reason, metaphysical realism and scepticism must be conceived as ‘two 
faces of the same coin’” (Parrini 2002: 72, my translation; the quotes are from 
Preti 1974: 3, 7, 12; my translation). 
 
Following Preti, Parrini claims that the metaphysical realist “hands to the scep-
tic, on a silver platter, a standard of evaluation (the accordance with absolute reali-
ty or reality in itself) that our knowing is not able to satisfy because of the way it 
is structured (epistemic relativism)” (Parrini 2015: 44; my translation)1. 
However, a crucial point distinguishes Parrini from Preti. By taking the princi-
ple of verification as the criterion of meaningfulness, Preti conceived of metaphys-
ical realism as devoid of cognitive meaning. Parrini shares Preti’s attempt at de-
fusing radical scepticism by eradicating the metaphysical realism that is at its 
basis. At the same time, he seeks to develop an improved critique of metaphysical 
realism that takes into account the crisis of the principle of verification. This anal-
ysis is at the heart of Parrini’s positive philosophy, which is based on three key 
concepts: moderate epistemic relativism, holistic empiricism, and empirical real-
ism. 
 
1 According to Parrini, this applies also to those forms of metaphysical realism 
that adopt an attenuated version of correspondentism. 
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1.1.  Moderate epistemic relativism 
Parrini develops an analysis of knowledge that takes into account the scientific 
revolutions that occurred between the nineteenth and the twentieth century. This 
analysis leads Parrini to acknowledge the existence of various kinds of presuppo-
sitions of the cognitive process – linguistic, theoretical, methodological – which 
are not absolute since they can change in the course of scientific revolutions. Start-
ing with his first book (Parrini 1976), Parrini develops a relativized and contextu-
alized concept of the a priori and of the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
judgements. 
Parrini develops this view by analysing the rejection of the synthetic a priori by 
logical empiricists. He highlights the fact that these authors vacillated between dif-
ferent views, before reaching a shared point of view, in line with H. Poincarè, on 
the linguistic and conventional nature of some general principles that connect the 
abstract plane of scientific theories with the concrete plane of empirical observa-
tion. These principles do not have an empirical content that can be directly 
verified as they are what makes possible the empirical testing of hypotheses and 
theories. The standard position of logical empiricists was to assimilate these prin-
ciples as rules of coordination or correspondence interpreted as linguistic-like 
conventions. However, Parrini shows that in the 1920s H. Reichenbach proposed a 
different view, affirming the synthetic-theoretical nature of what he called “consti-
tutive principles”. According to Reichenbach at that thime, the general principles 
that associate theory with experience are synthetic a priori principles. At the same 
time, these principles are relative to a certain theory and can be revised during sci-
entific revolutions. Reconnecting with Reichenbach’s and Pierre Duhem’s views, 
Parrini has thus argued since the 1970’s that the constitutive principles are not 
mere linguistic conventions. On the contrary, they have a theoretical content and 
an indirect empirical import, being possible to test them in front of the “court of 
experience”. However, this empirical testing is holistic.2 
1.2. Holistic empiricism 
The second key concept of Parrini’s positive philosophy is holistic empiricism. 
This is the thesis, taken from Pierre Duhem, according to which our theories go to 
the court of experience as a whole. In fact, in the light of new experimental results 
that clash with a given theory (for example Michelson and Morley’s experiment in 
relation to the aether theory, which is at the basis of Einstein’s special relativity) 
experience can declare that there is an implicit contradiction in a theoretical 
framework (Parrini 2006: 35). Parrini thus argues that we must accept the well-
 
2 Parrini’s view of the relativized a priori must be distinguished from Michael 
Friedman’s view. The latter was developed some decades later and draws on, with 
some hesitations, the neoempiricist thesis of the conventional and linguistic char-
acter of the “coordination principles”. On this point see (Parrini 2017: 248-249; 
Westphal 2017: 175). 
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known thesis of the empirical underdetermination of scientific theories (different 
logically conceivable theories are compatible with the same complex of empirical 
data) with the theoretical overdetermination of experience. The latter thesis is ex-
plicitly stated by Reichenbach and is implicitly present already in Duhem and 
claims that experience can show, in a holistic manner, the incompatibility between 
certain empirical data and a specific theoretical system, without pointing at the 
specific parts of the theory that are responsible for the empirical inadequacy.3 
1.3. Empirical realism 
The third key concept of Parrini’s positive philosophy, together with moderate 
epistemic relativism and holistic empiricism, is empirical realism. Parrini takes up 
the distinction already introduced by Kant and further developed by Rudolf Car-
nap, between two concepts of reality: empirical and metaphysical (or absolute, “in 
itself”). According to logical empiricists, in the light of the principle of verifica-
tion conceived of as the criterion of meaningfulness, the notion of a metaphysical 
reality that is absolutely independent from cognitive acts is devoid of meaning. 
This is because, in principle, this notion cannot be empirically verified. We have 
seen that Preti drew on this view when criticizing metaphysical realism. On the 
contrary, Parrini argues that the notion of a metaphysical reality in itself is not 
meaningless and that it is somehow legitimated by the problem of knowledge 
(Parrini 2015: 33) and implicit in the way we ordinarily conceive of cognition, 
within what Husserl calls the natural attitude (see Parrini 2015: 24). For this rea-
son, Parrini claims that the critique of the notion of an absolute reality must be de-
veloped on a different, meta-ontological level (Parrini 2015b: 70). 
By drawing on Carnap’s notion of explication, Parrini argues that a fundamen-
tal philosophical task is to elaborate or rationally reconstruct the concepts that we 
ordinarily make use of in an “unreflective” way. Parrini develops this analysis 
concerning the main epistemological notions: reality, objectivity, truth and 
knowledge. In the light of this analysis, he claims that, notwithstanding the fact 
that the notion of metaphysical reality is not meaningless, from the epistemologi-
cal point of view it is concretely “inoperative”. This is because of the “impossibil-
ity of directly comparing it with our beliefs” (Parrini 2015a: 46, my translation). 
That is, looking at our concrete cognitive practices, when we have to solve dis-
 
3 For example, experience alone cannot tell us if within Newtonian physics 
(with its implicit postulation of absolute space and time and the Euclidean struc-
ture of physical space) the “clash” with new experimental data is due to the physi-
cal or to the geometrical component. As we know, whereas Lorentz’s transfor-
mations adapt the laws of optics to the new data (thus preserving the absolute 
character of space and time), Einstein chooses to turn the constant value of the 
speed of light into a constitutive principle of the theory of special relativity (thus 
renouncing the absoluteness of space and time). On these themes see especially 
(Parrini 2012; 2014). 
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putes and disagreements (for instance when two people disagree concerning the 
alignment of a painting attached to the wall, in an example made by Heidegger), 
the notion of metaphysical reality is of no use. This is because this notion of reali-
ty would be absolutely independent from cognitive practices such as the meas-
urement through instruments (e.g. a spirit level) or the comparison between dream 
and wakefulness, veridical perception and hallucination. What we can concretely 
do in our cognitive practices, both ordinary and scientific, is to compare our epis-
temic claims to a reality that is given within experience and that can be thus 
known only on the basis of various epistemic presuppositions (linguistic, theoreti-
cal and methodological). This analysis leads Parrini to reject the notion of meta-
physical reality, which always risks turning into scepticism, in order to develop an 
epistemological view that is centred on the notion of empirical reality. 
At the same time, Parrini also redefines the concepts of truth and objectivity, 
conceiving of them not in correspondentistic and representational terms but as 
empty regulative ideals. This means that the notions of truth and objectivity do not 
have an unchangeable content. They are ideals that guide our cognitive efforts to-
wards syntheses of the empirical data that are more and more broad and inclusive. 
Drawing on a metaphor from Georg Simmel, Parrini likens the notions of truth 
and objectivity to “‘empty buckets’ which are filled at the river of history” (Parrini 
1998: 151) and that receive their content from the best theories that we are able to 
develop at a given time. 
Parrini’s epistemological view is therefore anti-foundationalist and anti-
absolutist, constituting a “third way” – or, better, a “narrow way” (Lecis 2013) – 
between radical relativism and metaphysical realism. This narrow way is aimed at 
safeguarding the objectivity of our epistemic claims without falling into the abso-
lutization of the object of knowledge, which is always at risk of turning into radi-
cal scepticism. At the heart of this view there is an empiricist and a constructivist 
aspect. The empiricist aspect is contained in the negation of the synthetic a priori 
when understood in terms of necessary and universal validity. The constructivist 
aspect consists in acknowledging the crucial cognitive role of principles that are 
produced by human thinking. 
 
 
2. The Phenomenological Way: Empirical Basis 
and Constitution 
The above seen epistemological view is based on the possibility of empirically 
testing our theories, notwithstanding the fact that the theoretical constructions that 
account for experience can change over time. It is in relation to the possibility of 
empirically verifying our theories that Husserl’s phenomenology comes into play 
at the heart of Parrini’s epistemological thought. According to Parrini, Husserl’s 
phenomenology constitutes a “fourth way” that is different from the three ways 
that Friedman (2000) sees as separating and moving in different directions in 20th-
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century philosophy: neokantianism, logical empiricism and Heideggerian herme-
neutics.4 The “phenomenological way” allows us to address the issue of the empir-
ical basis of knowledge in a specific manner.  
2.1. Husserl and Kant: the cognitive role of intuition 
In order to show the specific features of the “phenomenological way” in Par-
rini’s thought, we can follow, as a guiding thread, the relationship between Hus-
serl and Kant. Parrini highlights the continuity between the Kantian and the Hus-
serlian conceptions of knowledge in terms of an intertwining of form and matter. 
This is in contrast with the downplaying of the material dimension of knowledge 
in some neo-Kantians (such as Paul Natorp) and in the logical empiricists (espe-
cially Moritz Schlick). To be precise, Parrini highlights the fact that in some re-
views in the years 1910-1916 Schlick showed an appreciation of a central theme 
in Husserl’s phenomenology (Parrini 2014: 145 ff.): the essential role of empiri-
cal-intuitive components in the process of knowing, as opposed to the downplay-
ing of these elements in some neo-Kantians. According to Schlick, the latter in-
sisted on the formal and conceptual dimension in Kant’s analysis of knowledge to 
the detriment of the material content. However, according to Kant, the material 
content has an essential role in accounting for the possibility of having knowledge 
of a particular object (as we know, for Kant concepts without intuitions are empty 
and the forms of our sensibility synthetically unify a given sensory manifold). 
However, in the same years, Shlick strongly criticized the “philosophies of in-
tuition” in authors such as Henry Bergson, Bertrand Russell (with the notion of 
“knowledge by acquaintance”) and Husserl. Concerning the latter, Schlick criti-
cizes the theory of eidetic intuition (Wesensschau) and sets it up against the dis-
tinction between Kennen (immediate intuition, understood as a dyadic relation be-
tween subject and object) and Erkennen (knowledge, understood as a triadic 
relation between knower, known, and that through which the known is re-
cognized). This distinction is aimed at denying the cognitive import of intuition, 
which according to Schlick pertains to the domain of life, which is distinct from 
knowledge. 
However, according to Parrini, Schlick’s view does not account for an element 
of the process of knowing that is essential in the neo-empiricist view, i.e. the em-
pirical-observative dimension that is at the base of the cognitive edifice (and that 
is expressed by propositions whose problematic status is at the heart of the so-
called “protocol-sentence debate”).5 
 
4 Friedman refers to the three “ways” that were represented by Ernst Cassirer, 
Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger at a famous meeting in Davos in 1929. On 
this theme see (Parrini 2012; 2014; 2017a). 
5 For the comparison between Husserl and Schlick on the theme of intuition see 
(Lanfredini 2002). 
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The reference to the phenomenological theory of knowledge has a central role 
in Parrini’s view, which requires that experience provides us with a relatively neu-
tral basis for empirically testing the theories, thus avoiding the drift towards radi-
cal relativism due to the strong version of the theory-ladenness thesis (vacuous-
ness of empirical testing and incommensurability of scientific theories). Husserl’s 
phenomenology points out the possibility of accounting for the empirical basis of 
knowledge, by means of its acknowledgement of the essential role of intuition in 
the cognitive process. 
2.2. Form and matter 
However, Parrini also highlights some problematic and open aspects of the 
phenomenological view concerning the relationship between form and matter. 
These problematic aspects lead us to find a tension between empiricism and con-
structivism in the phenomenological theory of knowledge (see Parrini 2017a: 7). 
In order to highlight this tension, we must look in detail at the phenomenological 
analysis of intuition and, specifically, of perception. 
According to Husserl, the perceptual process involves the combination of two 
elements: intentional form (morphè) and sensory matter (hyle). The concrete per-
ceptual act consists in the intentional “animation” of hyletic contents. However, in 
par. 85 of Ideas I Husserl raises the problem of defining the precise relationship 
between these two aspects of experience, asking if we can accept “formless mat-
ters” and “stuffless forms” (Husserl 1983: par. 85). In Ideas I, Husserl leaves this 
issue open, suggesting that the answer requires the “genetic” broadening of phe-
nomenology, by investigating the temporal constitution of experiences. I stress the 
fact that this open question in phenomenology concerns the possibility of finding a 
material basis of knowledge that is devoid of any formal element. As we know, in 
the light of the transcendental arguments, Kant ruled out this possibility: we must 
exclude the possibility of “judgements of perception” that do not involve the in-
tervention of categories (for example the category of substance in perceiving 
something that lasts over time or the category of cause in perceiving a temporal 
succession). In this way, Kant’s view is different from reductionist empiricism, 
which claims to find a pure dimension of experience that is not conditioned by 
subjective-formal presuppositions. 
At this point, we can ask about the position of Husserl’s phenomenology in the 
contrast between Kant’s view and reductionist empiricism. From the phenomeno-
logical standpoint, we can ask: is it possible to isolate a pure hyletic basis that is 
absolute, being not dependent on formal conditions (which after the crisis of Kant-
ianism in the light of scientific revolutions could be considered as changeable with 
the change of conceptual frameworks)? 
2.3. Phenomenology and realism 
The relationship between form and matter is an open issue in Husserl’s phe-
nomenology and it crisscrosses the problem of realism. Some central phenomeno-
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logical notions, such as eidetic intuition, material a priori and material ontology 
could be seen as implying an absolutistic conception of the object of knowledge 
and in particular of the object of perception and therefore of the “material thing” 
that appears in perception. This is what is claimed by the so-called “realist” inter-
pretations of phenomenology. According to them, the motto “to the things them-
selves” refers to the possibility of phenomenologically describing material reality 
“in itself”, independently of the relationship with a knowing subject. However, 
Parrini criticizes these views, which end up to claim a naïve form of metaphysical 
realism. In particular, according to some phenomenological realists, material reali-
ty is endowed with objective properties that are not only physical-mathematical 
but also “qualitative” – in contrast with the “scientific” form of metaphysical real-
ism, which conceives of the so-called “secondary” properties as merely subjective 
appearances.6 
Parrini’s epistemological inquiry leads us to highlight the fact that the notion of 
reality that is involved in these realist interpretations of phenomenology is the 
concept of an absolute-metaphysical reality. These views conceive of knowledge 
as the mirroring of a transcendent reality that is pre-constituted with respect to the 
cognitive process that leads us to directly know it. However, following Preti’s 
teaching, Parrini highlights the fact that Husserl’s phenomenology brings into 
question the notion of an absolutely transcendent reality (metaphysical reality). 
This is because the phenomenological inquiry is developed as an “immanent” 
analysis of the cognitive process and therefore of the correlation between subject 
and object. In fact, according to Husserl the notion of metaphysical reality in-
volves a “material countersense” (Husserl 1983: 90).7 
We must also notice that Husserl develops this critique to the notion of abso-
lutely transcendent reality by referring to the process of “absolutizing Nature as 
conceived by physics” (Husserl 1983: 101), within scientific realism – or, better, 
 
6 An example of realist phenomenology is Barry Smith’s “qualitative ontology” 
(see Smith 1995; 1999). This view brings together Husserl’s phenomenology with 
James Gibson’s ecological theory of perception. The latter, in turn, implies a form 
of “direct” or “naïve” realism (see Gibson 1967; 1972). However, in contrast with 
Gibson’s direct realism, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology conceives of the 
object of perception as the correlate of a process of constitution. For this reason, 
the material thing is not an absolutely transcendent reality with respect to the cog-
nitive process (on this point see Zhok 2013). On the contrary, Smith argues that by 
combining Husserl’s phenomenology with Gibson’s ecological theory it is possi-
ble to develop “A radically new, realist interpretation of Husserl’s ‘constitutive 
phenomenology’” (Smith 1999: 319) and “a new, naturalized interpretation of 
Husserlian phenomenology” (Smith 1999:317). 
7 On this point and in relation to the crucial concept of motivational links see 
(Lanfredini 2004). 
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within the metaphysical version of scientifical realism.8 That is, within what 
Sellars called the “scientific image of the world” (Sellars 1962). In Husserl’s view, 
the scientific image is based on the abstraction of the so-called “primary proper-
ties” of the object of experience in order to isolate the component that can be 
mathematized and idealized. This is the operation through which we construe sci-
entific objectivity and it is valid provided that we don’t take “for true being what 
is actually a method” (Husserl 1970: 51). However, the “naïve” or “common 
sense” form of metaphysical realism could be conceived of as legitimised by phe-
nomenological notions such as eidetic intuition and material a priori. At the same 
time, Husserl’s critique to the metaphysical hypostatization of the object of physi-
cal-mathematical knowledge can be extended to any claim of reaching knowledge 
of reality considered “in itself”, independently of its being constituted as the 
correlate of a series of cognitive processes. In fact, the phenomenological theory 
of knowledge claims the relative and not absolute transcendence of the object, 
which is constituted as the correlate of constitutive functions of subjectivity. 
Therefore, following Kant, Husserl seems to reject all forms of metaphysical real-
ism, admitting the empirical and not metaphysical reality of the object of experi-
ence within a correlative analysis of knowledge. 
2.4. Kant’s concept of truth 
Parrini addresses the issue of realism in phenomenology by analysing some 
Heideggerian passages, where the author of Being and Time seems to argue for a 
phenomenologically based form of metaphysical realism. Parrini contrasts these 
passages with a specific interpretation of Kant’s concept of truth. Drawing on the 
above-seen example, Heidegger considers two people that turn towards a wall to 
verify the truth-value of the judgement according to which a painting is hanged 
crookedly. According to Heidegger, when I turn towards the wall I am not di-
rected towards mental representations. On the contrary, I am directed towards the 
“thing itself” that, in this way, is directly known (see Parrini 2017a: 8). However, 
Parrini argues against Heidegger that, notwithstanding the fact that we are directed 
towards the wall and the painting, the truth-value of our judgements concerning 
the alignment of the painting depends on their congruence with a set of principles 
that are at the basis of the constitution of cognitive objectivity. For instance, I 
must make use of measurements, which are based on a set of constitutive princi-
ples that are relatively a priori (see Parrini 1994). Furthermore, I must compare 
and synthesize different experiences in order to verify that I am really perceiving 
the painting and I am not dreaming or having a hallucination. 
Parrini thus opposes a specific reading of the Kantian concept of truth to the 
naïve or direct realism that is expressed in the above seen Heideggerian passages 
(Parrini 1994). He does so by distinguishing between nominal definition and the 
 
8 On the distinction between an empirical and a metaphysical version of scien-
tific realism see (Parrini 2002: 61). See also (Parrini 1998: 115 ff.). 
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criterion of the truth of the judgement. In giving the nominal definition, Kant 
draws on the traditional concept of truth as the agreement of a cognition with its 
object. However, the crucial point is to define the criterion through which we can 
evaluate the alleged truth of our judgements. According to Kant, in the case of 
empirical judgements this criterion consists in its agreement not only with material 
conditions (a given sensory manifold) but also with formal conditions. These for-
mal conditions of truth consist in the conformity of the judgement with a series of 
operations through which we establish, for example, the difference between verid-
ical perception and hallucination or between wakefulness and dream. In fact, ac-
cording to Kant the difference between dream and wakefulness is not found in the 
material content of the representations (which can be identical in both cases). The 
difference is found in the agreement or not of these representations with the prin-
ciples that rule correct judgement and that constitute, at the same time, the condi-
tions of possibility of experience. 
Kant argues that knowing does not mean to faithfully mirror a pre-constituted 
reality but it means to unify a given sensory manifold through constitutive func-
tions of subjectivity. This constructivist element in Kant’s view is in part present 
also in Husserl’s phenomenology. Also according to Husserl, in order to establish 
the truth of our cognitive claims and therefore their reference to empirical reality, 
we must insert the individual manifestation in the context of a series of experienc-
es that are motivated and concordant to one other. The criterion of truth is found in 
the genetic-motivational connection between phenomena (Husserl 1983: 89; see 
also Lanfredini 2004: 171; 2006: 91-93; 2012: 411-412). This is the connection 
that breaks up in dreams and hallucination, where the experiential course turns out 
to be full of gaps and inconsistencies. Therefore, in Husserl’s view, the immediate 
presence of an hyletic datum (e.g. a sensation of red) is not sufficient for perceiv-
ing an object (e.g. a red cherry). Perceiving requires the intentional animation of 
hyletic contents within a coherent experiential course, through which the material 
thing is constituted as the unitary correlate of an experiential synthesis. This is a 
constructivist element, of a Kantian origin, in the phenomenological conception of 
the constitution as correlation subjective-objective, which leads us to claim the 
empirical and not metaphysical reality of the object that is transcendent to con-
sciousness. 
 
2.5. The material a priori 
The issue of realism in phenomenology is strictly linked to the notion of mate-
rial a priori. This notion seems to refer to the possibility of having a priori 
knowledge (i.e. universal and necessary knowledge) of the content or matter of 
knowing, which would be expressed through apodictic judgements. Parrini dis-
cusses the epistemological features of these judgements that, according to Husserl, 
would express the necessary connection between material contents of experience 
(e.g. the relationship of bilateral foundation between color and extension of a vis-
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ual object, or between timbre and duration of a sound). According to Parrini, con-
sidering the synthetic (i.e. informative) character of these judgements and their a 
priori character (i.e. universal and necessary validity) leads us to ask if they clash 
with the same criticisms that have been raised against Kant’s concept of synthetic 
a priori in the light of scientific revolutions. According to Kant, the demonstration 
of the universal and necessary validity of synthetic a priori judgements is a norma-
tive and not factual matter. These judgements have a de jure and not de facto va-
lidity, which is demonstrated by the transcendental arguments of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. As is known, Kant’s transcendental turn consists in reaching the 
level of normativity in epistemology. The normativity of synthetic a priori 
judgements comes from the fact that they express the conditions without which 
experience (be it “internal” or “external”) would not be possible (e.g. the percep-
tion of permanence over time or the temporal succession of phenomena). Howev-
er, subsequent scientific developments have attacked Kant’s claim of having 
established conditions of possibility of experience that are given once for all and 
that are unchangeable. 
Is it the same concerning Husserl’s material a priori judgements? Should we 
acknowledge their revisability and therefore their non-apodicticity? A phenome-
nological answer to this objection can consist in claiming that, with this notion in 
mind, Husserl refers to the essential structure of sensory givenness (e.g. the essen-
tial connection between color and extension) and that this givenness does not re-
quire the intervention of concepts. On the contrary, it requires an intuitive unifica-
tion (Lanfredini 2006). Therefore, being not pertaining to the conceptual level, the 
material a priori judgements are not subject to revisions induced by theoretical 
changes. However, Parrini observes that this line of argument leads us to an out-
come that is different from Kant’s view, limiting us to the claim of a merely psy-
chological-subjective validity and not a transcendental validity in the Kantian 
sense (Parrini 2006: 37). This is because the material a priori judgements are not 
based on a transcendental deduction (which Kant conceives of in a juridical sense, 
being aimed at demonstrating the validity in principle of certain propositions and 
not their merely factual validity). For this reason, the material a priori judgements 
would express the structure of human sensibility, being essentially dependent on 
factual-contingent presuppositions. In this way, material a priori judgements 
would express a validity that is “a priori” only for beings that have certain factual 
features and not others.9 However, this conclusion goes against the realistic inter-
pretations of phenomenological ontology, which aim at grasping the essential fea-
tures of an absolutely transcendent reality (i.e. metaphysical reality). On the con-
trary, this conclusion leads us to acknowledge the factual basis of the constitution 
of experience and of the reality that is constituted as its correlate, thus leading us 
 
9 Parrini stresses the presence of this fluctuation between the factual-
psychological level and the normative level also in Kant, in relation to the individ-
uation of the forms of sensibility and in the way of framing the transcendental de-
duction of the categories (see Parrini 1994). 
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to a phenomenological concept of empirical reality, i.e. a phenomenological form 
of empirical realism. 
 
3. Lines of development of phenomenology in 
the light of positive philosophy 
In this section, I shall point out some lines of development of the phenomeno-
logical form of empirical realism that emerges from Parrini’s positive philosophy. 
3.1. Genetic and embodied phenomenology 
Parrini’s problematization of the notion of material a priori is compatible with a 
line of development of phenomenology that we can find, firstly, in Husserl himself 
and, secondly, in Merleau-Ponty. In fact, within the so-called “genetic” broaden-
ing of phenomenology, Husserl develops an embodied conception of conscious-
ness that acknowledges the bodily grounding of consciousness and its worldly and 
intersubjective dimensions (for instance in Husserl 2001; 1989; 1969). In the con-
text of this research, Husserl argues for the essential role of certain bodily struc-
tures and functions in the constitution of experience in its polarity subjective-
objective. In fact, the phenomenological analysis of the living body (Leib) leads us 
to highlight the constitutive role of structures and functions that depend on the 
specific bodily constitution of a living being. These factual features are, at the 
same time, presuppositions of the constitution, therefore a priori, with a contin-
gent status. In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl introduces the concept 
of contingent a priori (Husserl 1969: 26). The analyses of facticity in genetic phe-
nomenology investigate how the intentional animation of sensory matter depends 
on the factual constitution of the living body. In this way, the perceptual abilities 
of a living being turn out to be dependent on its bodily features (its embodiment). 
These contingent a priori conditions concern both matter and form of perceptual 
experience, which turn out to depend on the factual constitution of an embodied 
consciousness.10 
Therefore, the phenomenological analyses of corporeality develop in a pre-
conceptual and embodied direction the concept of knowledge as constitution. 
From the standpoint of genetic phenomenology, the primary constitution of objec-
tivity does not require the use of concepts (conceived of as linguistic-propositional 
entities). On the contrary, it requires certain forms of sensibility, conceived of as a 
priori presuppositions that are relative to the corporeal constitution of the living 
subject. 
This phenomenological analysis of the relative a priori status of bodily struc-
tures in the genesis of experience can be also found in Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
Samantha Matherne (2016) argues that, with his analysis of the concept of body 
 
10 On this point, see especially the analyses of the role of the living body in the 
process of constitution in Ideas II. 
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schema, Merleau-Ponty develops in a non-intellectualist way Kant’s doctrine of 
the schematism. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty redefines the notions of tran-
scendental and a priori, seeing in them the expression of “formal features of our 
facticity, without which there would be no experience” (Matherne 2016: 207). 
This view is coherent with Husserl’s notion of the “contingent a priori”, claiming 
that the a priori forms depend on factual features of an embodied subjectivity.11 
However, Parrini’s epistemological view leads us to make a clarification, espe-
cially in relation to the contemporary attempts at “naturalizing phenomenology”. 
In fact, the phenomenological analysis of facticity and corporeality must not be 
confused with an alleged naturalization of phenomenology. “Transcendental” 
phenomenology is, first of all, a critique of knowledge. Therefore, it is developed 
on an epistemological and not factual-psychological level. This means that the 
phenomenological analysis of facticity must be conceived as a development of the 
theory of knowledge that investigates the fundamental correlation between subject 
and object in the cognitive process. It is on the basis of this fundamental specifica-
tion that we can investigate the factual presuppositions of the constitution, reach-
ing a phenomenologically adequate conception of notions such as nature, body 
and living being.12 This is done within a correlative analysis, which looks at the 
co-constitution of subject and object in reciprocal dependence in the process of 
experience. Therefore, this inquiry must not be confused with the hypostatization 
of the region “nature” within certain attempts at “naturalizing” the mind and phe-
nomenology, which end up conceiving of nature as a fundamental metaphysical 
dimension to which subjectivity could be traced back to.13 
3.2. Phenomenology and the network model 
The genetic and embodied direction of inquiry in phenomenology combines 
empiricism and constructivism in the analysis of knowledge. A significant episte-
mological implication of this line of inquiry is that the embodied a priori forms are 
 
11 This development of phenomenology in a genetic and embodied direction is 
also at the base of the “enactive” approach developed by (Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch 1991). On this point see (Pace Giannotta 2017). 
12 See Pace Giannotta (2018) for the concept of empirical naturalism, as op-
posed to metaphysical naturalism, which is based on the phenomenological form 
of empirical realism. 
13 Parrini stresses the distinction between the “epistemologic” and the “scien-
tific-naturalistic” planes, in constrast with the attempts at “naturalizing epistemol-
ogy”. According to Parrini, the prospective success of such a project, which is 
“doubtful” and “far from being realized”, would mean that “not only epistemolo-
gy, conceived of as the analysis of the conditions of validity of our cognitive 
claims, but also ontology, conceived of in the terms of the problem of realism and 
anti-realism would disappear; only natural science would remain” (Parrini 2015a: 
49, my translation; see also Parrini 2015b: 75). 
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pre-conceptual. These forms are conditions of possibility of conceptualization; 
however, they do not univocally predetermine conceptualization, since they do not 
force the experience into fixed conceptual frameworks that are set forever. In this 
way, it becomes possible to account for two aspects of knowledge that are central 
in 20th-century epistemology: the theory-ladenness of observation and the revisa-
bility of theories and conceptual frameworks. 
We have seen that Parrini’s positive philosophy constitutes an alternative to the 
radical relativism that would follow on from the strong version of the theory-
ladenness thesis. In order to do so, it must be possible to test different theories in 
order to choose the one that is more compatible with experimental results. Accord-
ing to Parrini, this possibility is guaranteed by the “network model” of knowledge 
that has been developed by Mary Hesse (Hesse 1974; see also Lanfredini 1988; 
Parrini 1998: 74 ff.). 
The network model acknowledges at the same time the theory-ladenness of ob-
servation and the possibility of finding areas of empirical intersection between 
competing theories in order to test and compare them. This objective is obtained 
through a revision of the empiricist theory of concept-formation. Hesse’s “new 
empiricism” takes up from Quine the concept of an innate and prelinguistic “quali-
ty space”, which accounts for the innate power of the human mind to recognize 
similarities and differences between different situations by “weighing” the fea-
tures that appear in experience differently and on the basis of tacit criteria.14 The 
“primary process of recognition of similarities and differences” (Hesse 1974: 13) 
is at the basis of the formation of scientific language and allows us to find areas of 
empirical intersection between different theories. These differences are revealed 
by the linguistic behaviour of speakers in front of a certain phenomenon. For ex-
ample, we can refer to Michelson’s and Morley’s experiment: there is a phenome-
non – the vision or not of an interference pattern through the interferometer – that 
is conceptualized differently within different theories (the aether theory or Ein-
stein’s special relativity). However, we can say that the proponents of different 
theories share a common and basic phenomenal experience. 
I would like now to higlight some significant points of contact between Hesse’s 
network model and phenomenology. In fact, they both develop a sophisticated 
analysis of the empirical basis of knowledge. However, we have also seen that 
Husserl’s theory of eidetic intuition could be interpreted in absolutistic terms, 
within the realist interpretations of phenomenology. On the contrary, the genetic 
and embodied development of phenomenology investigates the bodily forms that 
are contingent a priori presuppositions of the constitution, thus limiting the alleged 
metaphysical implications of the doctrine of eidetic intuition. In accordance with 
the network model, this analysis leads us to claim the pre-conceptual nature of the 
empirical basis. The genetic-phenomenological analysis of the a priori forms of 
sensibility, conceived in bodily and pre-conceptual terms, accounts for the condi-
tions of possibility of those primary recognitions of similarities and differences 
 
14 For the details of this analysis see (Parrini 1998: 74 ff.). 
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that the network model founds at the basis of concept-formation. Quine conceived 
of the notion of “quality space” as the “minimal” innatist requirement of his em-
piricist view. This notion is taken up by Hesse’s network model and it is coherent 
with the phenomenological analysis of the qualitative structure of experience. 
However, this structure must not be conceived of as the structure of an alleged re-
ality in itself (metaphysical realism). On the contrary, it must be understood in the 
light of the phenomenological empirical realism, which is developed as an 
analysis of the correlation and co-constitution of subject and object in reciprocal 
dependence. 
3.3. Phenomenology and neutral monism 
Parrini’s analysis of the concepts of reality and truth also allows us to better 
understand another possible development of embodied and genetic phenomenolo-
gy. This inquiry goes to the core of the constitution of the life of consciousness in 
the stream of primal impressions (Urimpressionen). This inquiry can be further 
developed by conceiving the impressional core of experience as a fundamental 
“ontological” dimension that precedes the constitution of subject and object. This 
is because, by investigating the “genesis of constitution” (Husserl 2001: 644), ge-
netic phenomenology investigates the co-constitution of the subject and the object 
in reciprocal dependence. In the light of this analysis, the process through which a 
certain object is constituted turns out to be the process through which the subjec-
tive pole of cognition is also constituted. 
In this way, the phenomenology of genesis turns out to be close to the view 
known as neutral monism. This is the view pioneered by philosophers such as 
Ernst Mach, William James and Bertrand Russell and that is nowadays the object 
of reassessment in various sectors of contemporary philosophy.15 However, in the 
light of its rational reconstruction of the concepts of reality, truth and objectivity, 
Parrini’s epistemological inquiry allows us to distinguish between different forms 
of neutral monism. In particular, we can distinguish Mach’s doctrine of the “neu-
tral elements” from the subsequent development of neutral monism as a form of 
metaphysical realism in authors such as James and Russell. This interpretation of 
Mach’s view contrasts with Erik Bank’s interpretation, which stresses the continu-
ity between Mach, James and Russell and conceives of Mach’s view as a philoso-
phy of nature and as a metaphysics of neutral elements. According to this reading, 
Mach finds in the “elements” a fundamental metaphysical dimension that is pre-
subjective and pre-objectual, by conceiving of the subject and the object as con-
structions from complexes of elements. However, Parrini (2017c) stresses the fact 
that Mach conceived of this view as a scientific and not metaphysical hypothesis, 
which aims at investigating the relationship between two scientific disciplines: 
physics and psychology. Mach thus develops his “neutral monism” with a sharp 
criticism to the absolutistic claims of metaphysics. For this reason, Parrini warns 
 
15 See (Banks 2003; 2010; Stubenberg 2014). 
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us against the temptation of making the metaphysical “leap” that consists in con-
ceiving of the pre-subjective and pre-objectual dimension of experience as a “fun-
damental”, “absolute” or “ultimate” reality that is absolutely independent from 
contingent presuppositions of the cognitive process. 
In this way, Parrini’s reading of Mach’s philosophy points to the possibility of 
conceiving of neutral monism as a scientific-philosophical hypothesis that sets out 
a general and non-metaphysical conception of reality. This is in accordance, again, 
with the phenomenological empirical realism that is revealed by Parrini’s positive 
philosophy.16 
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